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 INDUSTRIAL POLICY FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT:  









This paper argues that industrial policy, defined as a conscious effort on the part of government to 
encourage and promote a specific industry or sector, is an indispensable tool for economic 
development. Serbia is experiencing a process of de-industrialisation since 1990s. During the period 
2001-2012 its industry has been growing at an average annual rate of 0.2%, but it however still did 
not reach the output of the late 1989. The share of industry in GDP has been decreased, as well as the 
share in the labour productivity. Moreover, employment in industry has sharply decreased. Serbian 
exports are dominated mostly by primary and labour- and resource-intensive products making 
unfavourable export structure. This paper argues that devastated industry of Serbia cannot recover 
without conscious efforts on the part of government.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The topic of industrial policy and its relevance for economic development has been highly contested 
during the past couple of decades. While some scholars, and particularly those from liberal tradition, 
have argued that state interventions have negative impact on economy and that market should be left 
on its own, the others, from the so called heterodox approach, stressed that industrial policy is an 
indispensable tool for economic development, which cannot happen through market mechanisms 
alone. Nowadays, there seems to be consent among the scholars and policy makers that industrial 
policy is an important tool, and the focus of discussion is changed from whether a country needs an 
industrial policy to how industrial policy should be designed and implemented. However, when 
talking about industrial policy authors often have in mind very different definitions.  
 
The topic of industrial policy is highly relevant for Serbia today. The aim of this paper is two-fold. On 
the one hand, it aims at showing the importance of industrial policy for economic development, 
drawing from a relevant literature review. On the other, it aims at presenting and discussing the 
industrial development and the industrial policy in Serbia. 
 
This paper has two sections. In the first section, we will provide definitions of industrial policy, then 
discuss the arguments in favour of its implementation, outline its main challenges and critiques, and 
finally present the main principles articulated in the literature about how industrial policy should be 
created and implemented. Then, in the second section, we will present the data on economic and 
industrial development in Serbia in past couple of decades, and we will analyse the industrial policy of 
the country. 
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INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN A NUTSHELL 
Two types of definitions of industrial policy could be found in the literature. Industrial policy, defined 
in a broad sense, encompasses all public policies that have an impact on industrial development, 
namely: “policies affecting ‘infant industry’ support of various kinds, but also trade policies, science 
and technology policies, public procurement, policies affecting foreign direct investments, intellectual 
property rights and the allocation of financial sources” (Cimoli, Dosi, Stiglitz 2009: 1). When defined 
in a more narrow sense, industrial policy is seen as “a concerted, focused, conscious effort on the part 
of government to encourage and promote a specific industry or sector with an array of policy tools” 
(DCED 2013), or “a policy aimed at particular industries (and a firms as their components) to achieve 
the outcomes that are perceived by the state to be efficient for the economy as a whole” (Chang 2003a: 
112).  
 
The question that rises is why there is a need for that effort on the part of government to encourage 
and promote a specific industry or sector or even firms. The shortest answer is that industrial policy is 
needed in order to foster economic development, seen as “great transformation from traditional 
economies to economies driven by industrial activities (and nowadays also advanced services)” 
(Cimoli, Dosi, Stiglitz 2009). More precisely, a country needs industrial policy because: (1) market 
fails to solve a coordination problem (Chang 2003a); (2) only certain activities, namely those with 
increasing returns, technological change and synergies, enable economic development, while the 
others, characterised by diminishing returns, unskilled labour, extreme price fluctuations, etc., keep a 
country underdeveloped (Reinert 2007); (3) in the presence of more developed countries, less 
developed countries cannot develop industries without a state intervention (Reinert 2007, Chang 
2003b); (4) entrepreneurial - risk taking, visionary state invests in areas, crucial for economic 
development, where the private sector does not invest (Mazzucato 2013). We will briefly discuss all 
four arguments.  
 
The first argument in favour of industrial policy is based on the market failure. It stresses the necessity 
of an ex ante coordination of economic actors’ activities. More precisely, in modern industrial 
economies, characterised by scale economies, only few firms can operate, which results in an 
oligopolistic competition. In such case economic actors are strategically interdependent, which leads 
to inefficiency and a state intervention is necessary. Chang argues that intervention needed here is not 
necessary an antitrust-type policy (Ibid). Since in modern industrial economies, assets are specific and 
they lose value when redeployed, coordination problem leads towards net reduction in the amount of 
resources available to the economy (Ibid). In order to solve a coordination problem, the following 
policies could be used: investment coordination, recession cartel, negotiated exit or capacity scrapping 
(for more details see Chang 2003a). 
 
The second argument that stresses the necessity of industrial policy is based on the assumption that 
country’s productivity growth is dependent on the economic activities in which it specialises (Reinert 
2007). In addressing the questions how rich countries became rich and why the poor stayed poor, 
Reinert argues that economic development is activity-specific and that it takes place in activities with 
increasing returns, technological change and synergies4. He distinguishes between two types of 
economic activities. On the one hand, Shumpeterian activities, which operate in manufacturing, by 
means of continual innovation leads to increasing wages, create welfare and development, while on 
the other Malthusian activities characterised by diminishing returns, unskilled labour, extreme price 
fluctuations, etc., and found in agriculture and raw material extraction, keep wage-levels close to the 
subsistence level (Ibid). Thus, it does matter whether a country specializes in labour- and/or resource-
intensive types of activities or more technologically advanced, capital-intensive manufacturing. In 
other words, what a country produces influences how wealthy it is.  
                                                     
4
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create the structural change we call economic development” (Ibid 37) 
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The third argument states that, in the presence of more developed countries, a less developed country 
needs a state intervention through an industrial policy in order to develop new industries (Chang 2003, 
Reinert 2007). This is known as “infant industry argument”. Infant industry argument was first set out 
by Alexander Hamilton, the first Secretary of the Treasury of the USA, in his Reports of the Secretary 
of the Treasury on the Subject of Manufactures in 1791 (Chang 2003a, Reinert 2007), and further 
developed by Friedrich List in his book The National System of Political Economy published in 1841 
(Ibid). Hamilton argued that due to the competition from abroad new industries that could become 
internationally competitive would not appear in the USA unless their initial losses were covered by the 
government (Ibid). These infant industries needed protection from the competition of more advanced 
foreign (in this case British) competitors until they grow enough to be able to compete on international 
markets. Hamilton advocated for the state aid in form of duties or in the rare cases prohibition of 
import (Chang 2003a). Thus, the industrial development of todays most developed country was based 
on interventionist policies and only when it obtained industrial supremacy, USA finally liberalised its 
trade (Ibid). However, USA was not the first to use infant industry protection. According to List, that 
was Britain (Chang 2003a). List argues that free trade is beneficial for the countries at the same level 
of development, while infant industries need to be protected until they are able to compete on 
international markets. The policy of infant industry protection, “by a system of restrictions, privileges, 
and encouragements” were used by the Britain and the USA, but also Germany, France, Sweden, 
Belgium, Netherlands, Switzerland, and they lie behind the success of Japan and Asian newly 
industrialised countries (Chang 2003a).  
 
Finally, not only do less developed countries need industrial policy in order to climb up the ladder of 
economic prosperity, but an “entrepreneurial state” is the main driving force of the most developed 
countries, which is our fourth argument in favour of industrial policy. Mazzucato argues that “the 
radical, revolutionary innovations that have fuelled the dynamics of capitalism - from railroads to the 
Internet, to modern-day nanotechnology and pharmaceuticals – trace the most courageous, early and 
capital-intensive ‘entrepreneurial’ investments back to the State” (Mazzucato 2013: 3). She argues that 
“the visible hand of the State” made possible for investments that have embedded radical uncertainty 
to happen (Ibid). She points out that “all of the technologies that make Job’s iPhone so ‘smart’ were 
government funded (Internet, GPS, touchscreen display and the recent SIRI voice activated personal 
assistant)” (Ibid). Thus, contrary to the wisdom of the mainstream economics, which perceives private 
sector as dynamic and risk-taking, in fact, as Mazzucato argues, the most risky and uncertain activities 
in the economy are undertaken by the State, which takes shapes and creates new markets. Moreover, 
as Weiss argues, whilst it was not titled as industrial policy, the majority of governments continued to 
intervene in markets, affecting the economy in a highly selective manner (Weiss 2013). These 
interventions have been described as ‘competitiveness policy’, and many countries have published 
programmes to raise competitiveness, usually focusing on incentives for R&D and innovation.  
 
After we have presented arguments in favour of industrial policy, we will now turn to its criticism of 
industrial policy. To begin with, critics of implementation of industrial policy stress the problem of 
information. They argue that it is impossible for governments to identify with any degree of precision 
and certainty the relevant firms, sectors, or markets that should be supported (Rodrk 2007). Since the 
government cannot have all the necessary information, it can “miss its targets, support economic 
activities with no positive spillovers, and waste the economy’s resources”, which is usually phrased as 
“governments cannot pick winners” (Ibid). Moreover, it is argued that industrial policy opens doors 
for corruption and rent seeking (Ibid). If governments provide support to the firms, the firms may 
demand extra benefits and then distort competition, and they would also engage much more in asking 
support than they would look for the ways to expand markets and reduce costs (Ibid). However, as 
Rodrik points out, “none of this makes this area of policy different from conventional areas of 
government responsibility such as education, health, social insurance and safety nets, infrastructure, or 
stabilization“ (Rodrik 2007: 36). In other words, the question is not whether a country needs an 
industrial policy, it is much more about how an industrial policy should be created and implemented. 
Stressing that each country is a specific case, Rodrik outlines three general principles about how 
institutions carrying out industrial policy should be designed (Ibid).  
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First of all, an industrial policy should be “embedded” within society. According to Rodrik, industrial 
policy should not be seen as a list of policy instruments, but rather as a process of discovery. A close 
collaboration between the government and the private sector is thus needed. Rodrik argues that the 
right model for industrial policy lies in between the two extremes of strict autonomy of the state, on 
the one hand, and private capture, on the other. “It is a model of strategic collaboration and 
coordination between the private sector and the government with the aim of uncovering where the 
most significant bottlenecks are, designing the most effective interventions, periodically evaluating the 
outcomes, and learning from the mistakes being made in the process” (Ibid: 39). He also outlines 
major institutions in support for industrial policy formulation and implementation, such as deliberation 
councils, supplier development forums, “search networks,” investment advisory councils, sectoral 
round-tables, and private-public venture funds. He also stresses that contests in which private sector 
firms bid for public resources are useful for eliciting private-sector needs and priorities (Ibid).  
 
Secondly, using “carrots and sticks” in order to incentive and discipline economic actors is crucial. As 
it has been already mentioned, an infant industry should be protected for certain period, even though it 
makes losses. Moreover, innovation requires rents for entrepreneurs, without which there would be too 
little investment in the activities that promote structural change. In other words, incentives (“carrots”) 
need to be designed for economic actors in order to engage in Shumpeterian activities. However, at the 
same time firms must be disciplined and it must be ensured that they do not stay unproductive 
monopolies. In other words, as Rodrik argues “the conduct of industrial policy has to rely on both 
prongs: it needs to encourage investments in non-traditional areas (the carrot), but also weed out 
projects and investments that fail (the stick)” (Ibid: 41). Rodrik lists the following mechanisms used in 
order to bring discipline: conditionality, sunset clauses, built-in program reviews, monitoring, 
benchmarking, and periodic evaluation are desirable features of all incentive programs, requiring that 
an incentive expire unless a certain goal is reached. It is important that the evaluation criteria are clear 
and set in advance (Ibid).  
 
Thirdly, accountability on the part of the state is essential. While business is monitored by bureaucrats, 
the bureaucrats need to be accountable for their policies and monitored by the general public. Rodrik 
argues that there need to be identified a person “who has the job of explaining why the agenda looks 
as it does, and who can be held politically responsible for things going right or wrong” (Ibid: 40). 
Moreover, accountability can be fostered at the level of individual agencies by giving them clear 
mandates and then asking them to report achievements and deviations. Finally, a fundamental tool for 
accountability is transparency. Thus councils should make publications of the activities. Also, periodic 
accounting of the expenditures made under industrial policies is needed. In addition, any request made 
by firms for government assistance should be public information and government-business dialogs 
should remain open to new entrants. 
 
To sum up, we have argued that industrial policy, as a conscious effort on the part of government to 
encourage and promote a specific industry or sector with an array of policies, is an indispensable tool 
for steering economic development. However, it needs to be carefully developed and implemented. 
Now, we will turn to Serbian industrial development. 
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN SERBIA  
A period of rapid industrialization of Serbia, after the Second World War, took place on the model of 
industrial centres. There were formed 26 big, 22 medium- sized and 114 small industrial centres by 
1960s (Strategy and policy of industrial development in Serbia in the period 2011 – 2020 2011; 
hereafter Strategy 2011). For most of the development after the Second World War, Serbian industry 
has been growing at very high growth rates. An average growth rate of 7.7% was recorded between 
1953 and 1990 (Savic, Boskovic 2011). Particularly satisfactory growth rates were achieved in the 
seventies, while the first difficulties manifested during the 1980s. An average growth rate during the 
1980s was only 1 per cent, and in some years it recorded negative rates (Ibid). Serbian industry 
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experienced a breakdown during the last decade of the twentieth century, when the average rate of 
growth of Serbian industry was negative (-6.6%). The process of transition after the 2000s resulted in 
further devastation of Serbia’s industry. Serbian economy is characterised by the very slow recovery 
to pre-transition peak. Serbia’s economy in 2008, before the global recession, reached only about 80% 
of GDP of the year 1990, while the industry has been at the level of 50% of the output in 1990. In fact, 
Serbia is the only country in transition, which has not yet reached level of industrial production from 
1989.  
 
Figure 1. Indices of industrial production, 1945–2000 (1990=100)  
 
Source: Strategy and policy of industrial development in Serbia in the period 2011 - 2020 
 
The average growth rate of GDP in the period 2001-2012 was 3.0 %. In particular, during the period 
before the economic crisis (2001-2008) the growth rate of GDP was 4.9%, while in the period 2009-
2012 there was a decrease of GDP at an average rate of 0.7 %. However, economic growth was based 
on privatisation followed by low level of technological development, employment reduction, as well 
as loss of intellectual resources, which led to negative technological progress. 
 
The GDP structure has changed significantly during the period 2001-2012. A characteristic of the 
period 2001- 2012 is a faster growth of the service sector compared to the manufacturing sector. 
Although industrial output has been growing on an annual average rate of 0.2%, manufacturing 
recorded negative growth (-0.1%). There was a significant decline in the share of the sector of 
agriculture, forestry and fishing (-9.1 %) and manufacturing (-5.4 %) in the total GDP, while there was 
an increase in the service sector’s share in GDP in 2012 as compared to 2001 of 9.5%. In short, a 
dominant concept of transitional reforms based on liberalization, privatization and structural changes 
in the period since 2001 led to deindustrialization of the economy, when manufacturing sector has 
been practically devastated.  
  
Table 1. Growth rate and share of GDP of different sectors in Serbia 2001-2012 








Agriculture, forestry and 
fishing 
0.1 19.5 10.4 -9.1 
Industry 0.2 24.6 23.5 -1.1 
Manufacturing -0.1 21.7 16.3 -5.4 
Construction 4.2 3.3 4.3 1.0 
Services 3.9 52.6 62.2 9.6 
Trade 7.5 7.5 10.8 3.3 
Transportation and storage 3.3 4.5 5.3 0.8 
Information and 14.3 3.7 5.4 1.7 
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Financial and insurance 
activities 
5.6 2.6 3.8 1.2 
Real estate activities 1.9 14.4 11.9 -2.5 
Source: Report on Development of Serbia 2012 
 
Table 2. Indices of industrial production, 2001–2012 (Previous year = 100) 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
111.4 100.1 101.8 97.0 107.1 100.8 104.7 103.7 101.4 87.4 101.2 102.5 97.8 
Source: Statistical Office, Republic of Serbia 
 
Figure 2. Indices of industrial production, 2001–2012 (Previous year =100) 
  
Source: Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia 
 
Employment in Serbian industry fell sharply in the period 2001 – 2008, from 619000 employees in 
2001 to 439000 in 2008. At the same time, number of employees in industry increased in transitional 
countries such as Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Romania and Slovakia. During the period 2001 – 2012 a 
number of employees in manufacturing virtually halved – from 570608 to 289286. 
 
Table 2. Employment in Industry in Selected Countries in Transition 
Country 2001 2008 +/- 
Bulgaria 645000 737000 92000 
Czech Republic 1396000 1441000 45000 
Hungary 959000 934000 -25000 
Romania 1895000  1967000 72000 
Slovenia 257000 237000 -20000 
Slovakia 517000 544000 27000 
Serbia 619000 439000 -180000 
Source: FREN, Serbian Post-Crisis Economic Growth and Development Model 2011-2020 
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Figure 3. Employment in Manufacturing in Serbia in the period 2001-2012 
 
Source: Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia 
 
Despite the large decrease in the number of employees in industry, a share of industry in labour 
productivity of Serbia has been diminishing since 2001. The labour productivity of each sector is 
calculated as the sum of GVA per employee of each sector, weighted by the sector’s share in the total 
number of employees in Serbia. In other words, the competitive position of each sector is not only 
determined by the amount of value added that each worker creates, but it also depends on the sector’s 
rate of employment. While share in productivity of industry was 26.6% in 2001, it was 20.7% in 2012.  
 
Figure 4. Sectoral contribution to labour productivity 
 
Source: Report on Development of Serbia 2012 
 
The existing technological structure of manufacturing industries is unfavourable (Ibid). In Serbian 
manufacturing low technology (49.9 %) and medium-low (25.6 %) predominate and they have in total 
a share of 75.5%.  
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Table 3. The structure of the manufacturing industry 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
High-technology 0,6 1,6 0,7 2,7 2,3 1,4 1,2 1,0 0,9 
Medium-high- technology 25,6 26,4 23,2 24,8 24,7 22,7 23,4 24,3 23,6 
Medium-low-technology 25,5 26,2 27,7 25,4 27,0 28,3 27,4 27,6 25,6 
Low-technology 48,3 45,8 48,4 47,1 46,0 47,6 48,0 47,1 49,9 
Source: Strategy and policy of industrial development in Serbia in the period 2011 – 2020 
 
Moreover, Serbia's foreign trade in the period 2001-2012 is characterized by high deficits and 
unfavourable export structure. The structure of Serbian exports is dominated by the products of the 
lower stages of processing (over 55%), largely raw materials and semi-finished products. These are 
mostly primary and labour- and resource-intensive products making unfavourable export structure. 
Serbia's economy depends on the product of low technological intensity, which recorded a growth in 
foreign trade in the 2011. The companies have increased the exports of medium-high- tech products, 
but, on the other hand, volume of trade in high-tech products recorded the highest decline in real terms 
by 18.8% compare to 2010 year. Thus, Serbian exports are dominated with low added value.  
 







Source: Report on Development of Serbia 2012 
 
To sum up, Serbia is experiencing a process of de-industrialisation in the past twenty years. During the 
period 2001-2012 its industry has been growing at an average annual rate of 0.2%, but it however still 
did not reach the output of the late 1989. The share of industry in GDP has been decreased, as well as 
share in the labour productivity of the country. Moreover, employment in industry has sharply 
decreased. Serbian exports are dominated mostly by labour- and resource-intensive products making 
unfavourable export structure, with low value added. Using Reinert’s words, Serbia is exporting 
products of Malthusian activities, and thus changing export structure can only be achieved by 
changing the structure of the entire economy. The next question we will address is whether Serbia has 
had an industrial policy during this period.  
 
The economic transition after 2000 was based on a neoliberal model of privatisation and liberalisation. 
Thus, Serbia did not explicitly define an industrial policy. However, there have been certain incentives 
for economic actors on the part of Government. In particular, institutional instruments of the 
Government and the Ministry of Economy and Regional Development for foreign direct investment 
and export promotion are framed by the formation of the Serbian Investment and Export Promotion 
Agency (SIEPA) and the Agency for Export Insurance and Financing (AOFI). Incentives (subsidies 
for greenfield investment) were routed in the manufacturing sector and the services that can be traded 
internationally (except for retail sale, tourism and agriculture). The main criteria have been the job 
creations, and grants are approved depending on the type of investment (Ibid). 
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Export incentives have been in form of grants to small and medium-sized companies to fund activities 
that contribute to the increase in exports, while export credit and insurance (over AOFI) has provided 
short-term loans to export companies.  
 
Incentives for economic and regional development have been provided through the Development Fund 
of the Republic of Serbia, the National Investment Plan (since 2006), various forms of state aid funds 
and foreign aid. From these sources in the period 2001-2009 through the various incentive instruments 
total amount of over 6.6 billion euro for 18,838 projects in different areas of the economy has been 
invested (Ibid). 
 
Table 4. Budget funds for programs of the Government for subsidies and credit support in the mill. 
RSD 
Sector 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Transportation 
system assets 1.658,8 1.848,0 1.640,0 1.347,5 1.435,0 1.365,2 1.839,7 1.653,7 1.229,4 
Metal 
complex 1.305,6 1.408,6 882,5 805,5 754,0 621,7 696,5 710,3 909,5 
Metallurgy 1.210,0 843,0 743,5 496,5 211,5 297,0 96,1 95,0 11,0 
Textile and 
leather 372,7 419,8 379,2 390,0 360,5 122,7 151,0 143,0 198,2 
Chemical 
Industry 397,7 430,5 420,5 406,0 330,5 295,5 215,2 343,4 13,9 
Processing of 
non-metals 182,5 305,0 231,5 210,5 285,5 45,5 172,2 74,2 111,0 
Electrical 
machinery  237,7 376,5 244,0 156,0 120,5 130,5 247,6 230,2 205,0 
Food industry 137,5 211,0 65,0 - - -  - 16,4  - 
Wood 
industry 132,0 121,0 149,5 174,0 161,0 12,5 16,5 3,0 78,0 
Industry - 
total 5.634,5 5.963,4 4.755.7 3.986.0 3.658.5 2.890.6 3.434.8 3.269.2 1526,6 
Construction 127,5 138,0 167,0 199,0 160,0 121,0 46,2 32,3 7,2 
Total (I + G) 5.762,0 6.101,4 4.922,7 4.185,0 3.818,5 3.011,6 3.481,0 3.301,5 1533,8 
Source: Strategy and policy of industrial development in Serbia in the period 2011 – 2020 
 
Although Serbia did not have an explicitly defined industrial policy, certain incentives in form of 
subsidies and credit support have been provided to the industry. However, as the above presented data 
indicate, these incentives did not have positive effects on industrial development of Serbia. 
 
It was only in 2011 when Government of Serbia adopted a Strategy and Policy of Industrial 
Development of Serbia 2011-2020. However, industrial policy is defined within this document as 
implementation of measures and policies in order to facilitate and encourage emergence of new 
enterprises in general (Ibid). It stresses that liberalisation and privatisation are the main concepts of 
industrial policy. Thus, it is not seen as conscious effort on the part of government to encourage and 
promote a specific industry or sector with an array of policy tools, as industrial policy is defined 
within this paper. We are of the opinion that, contrary to the main pillars outlines in the Strategy and 
Policy of Industrial Development of Serbia 2011-2020, in order to steer economic development, 
government needs to design incentives for particular sectors and firms as their components, as well as 
tools to discipline economic actors. We are of the opinion that devastated industry of Serbia cannot 
recover without conscious efforts on the part of government.  
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CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have argued that industrial policy is an indispensable tool for steering economic 
development. Serbia is experiencing a process of de-industrialisation. During the period 2001-2012 its 
industry has been growing at an average annual rate of 0.2%, but it however still did not reach the 
output of the late 1989. The share of industry in GDP has been decreased, as well as the share in the 
labour productivity. Moreover, employment in industry has sharply decreased. Serbian exports are 
dominated mostly by primary and labour- and resource-intensive products making unfavourable 
export structure.  
 
The economic transition after 2000 was based on a neoliberal model of privatisation and liberalisation. 
Although there have been certain incentives on the part of Government, an industrial policy has not 
been explicitly defined until 2011. However, industrial policy is defined within this document as 
implementation of measures and policies in order to facilitate and encourage emergence of new 
enterprises in general (Ibid). It stresses that liberalisation and privatisation are the main concepts of 
industrial policy. Thus, it is not seen as conscious effort on the part of government to encourage and 
promote a specific industry or sector with an array of policy tools as industrial policy is defined within 
this paper. We are of the opinion that, contrary to the main pillars outlines in the Strategy and Policy 
of Industrial Development of Serbia 2011-2020, in order to steer economic development, government 
needs to design incentives for particular sectors and firms as their components, as well as tools to 
discipline economic actors. We are of the opinion that devastated industry of Serbia cannot recover 
without conscious efforts on the part of government. 
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